The Bombings in Kampala and `Constructive Disengagement`
The recent terrorist bombings in Kampala have once again highlighted the enormity of the challenge posed by terrorism not only in Somalia but also throughout the region. The nature of the attack as well as the sheer cruelty of the choice of targets clearly shows how far the perpetrators are ready to take their terrorist campaign. The reaction of the international community was largely one of shock and surprise for few would have thought the extremists in Somalia were inclined to carry out such a campaign outside of Somalia and with such cold-blooded savagery. It is rather saddening to realise that only heinous attacks such as these could bring the attention of the international community back into the harrowing experiences of the peoples of the region.
In fact, the countries of the region have constantly warned the international community that enough was not being done to contain the scourge of terrorism that has long since become a threat not only to the peoples of Somalia and its neighbours but also to the international community at large, with the ever greater internationalisation of Jihad in the country. There has been incontrovertible evidence that the war in Somalia is not a war among factions in Somalia but a war between the peoples of Somalia and international terrorists. Nor have these forces ever minced their words about promoting the destructive agenda of Al Qaeda in the region and have even threatened to take their terrorist violence farther. It is an open secret that Al Shabab has been recruiting hundreds of terrorists from as far away as North America, Australia and West Europe in the name and as part of a global Jihad. Against this background however, the international community’s reaction against such a growing threat has been largely lukewarm at best. To the extent that there was any sustained interest on the part of the international community in the stability of the region, it is mostly expressed in terms of a surfeit of recommendations which have all too often fallen short of articulating much less addressing effectively the fundamental causes of the problem.
It does not require a genius to realise that the proliferation of terrorist groups in this part of Africa is largely to do with the fact that there is an acute lack of functioning state institutions in Somalia.
Somalia today is a safe haven for the who’s who of international terrorists simply because there is a security and governance vacuum that lends itself to the mushrooming of terrorist elements that prey on the sense of despondency of a population left to its own means. Any effort to rein in the growth of extremism in Somalia must therefore begin with addressing the deficit in a functioning central authority capable of exerting meaningful control over a significant portion of the country. Today the Transitional Federal Government and institutions under it offer the only viable alternative to build on if the quest for bringing together a semblance of functioning governance is to be achieved. But it is doubtful whether the international community - or the key players within it - have a clear understanding of how critical a role the strengthening of the TFG and its institutions can play in addressing the plight of the people of Somalia and the contribution this would have in holding in check the proliferation of terrorist elements in this part of the world and beyond. As the bombings in Kampala made it abundantly clear, addressing what at first appears to be a localised crisis will also go a long way in preventing the kind of large-scale mayhem extremists are so keen to inflict on civilians by way of promoting their unwholesome agendas.
Another reason - also closely linked with the first - why the likes of Al Shabab are allowed a measure of impunity to wreak unmitigated terror on civilians both within Somalia and beyond is the presence of a number of actors—state and non-state alike—that are actively involved in arming, financing or otherwise supporting these terrorist elements in their effort to perpetrate acts of terror without running a significant risk of being held to account for it. Al Shabab today enjoys a great deal of support from both like-minded terrorist outfits such as Al Qaeda and irresponsible regimes hell bent on promoting belligerent agendas throughout the region.
This all underlines the centrality of effectively and immediately addressing both factors that have contributed to the growing threat of terrorism as excruciatingly exemplified by the dispicable acts in Kampala. To begin with the second factor, there have been a couple of attempts - belated though they were - by the international community to take practical steps to address the role of both state and non-state actors actively involved in arming and financing the extremists in Somalia. More particularly, the United Nations Security Council has taken a few steps towards ensuring that such actors change their behaviour and stop their destructive role both in Somalia and within the whole region. But there is no reason to believe that these efforts have been paying off. If anything, the fact that the whole process is punctuated by a number of false starts and duplicitous diplomatic overtures on the part of some of the actors, has all but neutralised the possible efficacy of the measures taken thus far. It is therefore imperative that no such efforts be left to chance in order to make sure that the international community conveys an unequivocal message to all spoilers that are steadfastly standing in the way of peace and stability in the region.
But more importantly, the lack of meaningful engagement on the part of the international community at large - and the key players in it particularly - in extending practical support to the elements of peace and stability in Somalia has yet to be fully addressed. As we have reiterated several times before, the Djibouti framework and the Transitional Federal Institutions established under its auspices are the best opportunity yet to seek a lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia, which has far-reaching consequences for international peace and stability. This is not however to suggest that the TFG and its institutions have been playing their part as effectively as they ought to have. In fact, there is much to be desired in that regard. But one has also to realise that the political configuration obtaining in Somalia today is so chaotic that the TFG remains the best alternative to the decidedly zero-sum calculations of the coterie of extremist elements promoting a destructive agenda that knows no borders. In all fairness, it is not entirely correct to blame the TFG and its institutions for all that has gone wrong either. Despite a flurry of resolutions and series of promises, what the international community has thus far offered by way of practical support is a far cry from the kind of affirmative intervention that could have gone a long way towards sorting out the problem in Somalia.
As if the lack of such a practical support was not bad enough, however, there are also other factors that are playing havoc with the effort to strengthen the elements of peace and stability in Somalia, thereby - inadvertently perhaps - emboldening extremists and terrorists in their quest to wreak havoc in the entire region. As of late, a plethora of seemingly academic works have been appearing in various forums capable of informing policy decisions of some of the key players among the international community. Although they come in many forms and from different corners, the main thrust of these purportedly academic pieces is that what little support is being currently given to the TFG needs to be stopped because the latter has failed to deliver. This approach, deceptively referred to as ‘constructive disengagement’ by its advocates has been gaining some traction among a sizable section of policy-making circles of some key-players in the international community. Constructive disengagement, as a notion, is something of an oxymoron, but more worryingly, woefully bereft of any workable alternative, perhaps except offering - as it were - a thinly-veiled fig-leaf for shirking international responsibility. This is what the arch-sponsor of Al-Shabab in the region, the regime in Asmara, has all along been pushing.
Unfortunately, what Al Shabab did in Kampala was the anti-thesis of whatever the merits of ‘constructive disengagement’ may be. It is a stark reminder of the cost at which reluctance to act against terrorists often comes. Even more so, because this is happening at the cost of innocent civilians. As Prime Minister Meles said after these attacks, what the international community has to do is not to negotiate, but defeat these forces. If there still are those who cling to the naïve notion that it is still possible to make peace with Al Shabab, Kampala has made it abundantly clear that this is a mere exercise in futility. Action, and more action, is what is needed; this would, first and foremost, require recognizing that much of the job can be done within Somalia and by the Somalis - with support from the international community even if this was a fraction of what is being done elsewhere. As for constructive disengagement, it only represents the height of irresponsibility, nothing more, and nothing less.