Preventing “a failed state”: the responsibility of Eritrea’s leadership
Last week we welcomed the fact that the International Crisis Group had at least begun to take a close look at the increasingly worrying situation in Eritrea which, the report suggested, was lurching towards the status of a failed state. We would obviously, like all of Eritrea’s neighbours, prefer this not to happen. The possible ramifications of such a disaster would be frightening for Eritreans and for the rest of the Horn of Africa, even if it would bring an end to the perennial efforts of the Eritrean government to destabilize the region and its neighbours.
However, the ICG’s suggestion that the way to avoid Eritrea’s collapse into the status of a failed state is to put pressure on Ethiopia, to resolve the border problem between Eritrea and Eritrea, is something that certainly needs urgent correction. This is paralleled by the ICG’s implicit acceptance of Asmara’s view that the international community is inherently hostile to Eritrea. These are comments that demonstrate a failure to understand either the roots of Eritrea’s foreign and domestic policies, or of the aims and attitudes of President Isaias.
There are two major points here. One is that Eritrea’s problem with Ethiopia is of its own making; secondly, from Eritrea’s perspective it is clear that there is no longer a border issue if indeed there ever was. Eritrea has made it quite clear it is not prepared to normalize relations with the present government in Ethiopia.
The ICG warns that Eritrea might become a failed state unless pressure is put on Ethiopia to resolve the border problem. Let us not forget that the problem is actually of Eritrea’s making in the first place. It was Eritrea that invaded Ethiopia in May 1998 in defiance of the UN Charter, as the Claims Commission made clear; it was Eritrea that refused to respond to Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Boundary Commission’s Decisions in November 2004; it was Eritrea which systematically dismantled the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and elements of the Algiers Agreement; it was Eritrea that forced out the UN Mission (UNMEE) whose job was to monitor the Temporary Security Zone between the two armies, and provide for the security for demarcation. In fact, according to the Peace Agreement, UNMEE’s presence is a pre-requisite for demarcation. Equally, demarcation depends upon a cessation of hostilities, and Eritrea’s deliberate abrogation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement means that hostilities have continued as indeed Eritrea has demonstrated with its continued efforts to destabilize Ethiopia.
None of this has anything to do with Ethiopia. It could all be resolved by Eritrea’s President Isaias overnight – if he wished to do so; if he was prepared to swallow the blow to his pride caused by Eritrea’s defeat in June 2000. He is not, even though arrogance and pride are scarcely a sound basis for either internal or external policy. To be prepared to think again, to admit errors, still appears to be a psychological barrier for President Isaias.
The excuse so often made for Eritrea, and so often quoted by Eritrean officials – frustration at Ethiopia’s failure to demarcate - simply does not hold water, and constant repetition adds nothing to its value. In the first place, as we have repeatedly noted, Ethiopia has long accepted the Boundary Commission’s Decisions. It is Eritrea which has prevented demarcation of the border according to international norms, and which has repeatedly refused any dialogue to normalize relations. Equally to the point, Eritrea’s destabilization activities and aggression in the region started long before 2002, the year the Boundary Commission announced its decisions. Conflicts with Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia were all started by Eritrea in the 1990s. This policy has continued even after the defeat of Eritrea’s aggression against Ethiopia, as Eritrea again demonstrated in 2008 when its troops invaded Djibouti.
Similarly, Eritrea’s more recent claim that Ethiopia was occupying Eritrean territory is, as Ethiopia noted in its right of reply to Eritrea’s statement at the UN General Assembly, a figment of the imagination. Virtual demarcation, of course, has no legal standing and, as the Boundary Commission itself noted, until the boundary is actually demarcated the boundary accepted by Ethiopia in June 2000 remains the only valid one. As Ethiopia has consistently said, the most important task remaining is demarcation on the ground to ensure sustainable peace. Ethiopia is ready to sit and discuss all issues with Eritrea; Eritrea persistently refuses to hold any dialogue or any discussions to normalize relations.
There really is no excuse for Eritrea’s behaviour since independence, its consistent use of aggression as a central element in foreign policy, and more recently its efforts to use terrorism. Certainly, however, more attention should be paid to Eritrea, and we would not disagree with the point that the Eritrean government is “suspicious of its own population, neighbours and the wider world.” Having said that, however, it is very clear the root of the problem lies with the government and leadership of Eritrea which holds these suspicions, suspicions for which there is no independent or impartial evidence. In fact, as Ethiopia has been made only too aware, the problem between Eritrea and Ethiopia now has nothing to do with the border. Eritrea has made the issue one of attempting to overthrow the government of Ethiopia, of regional power and hegemony, and of the pride of its president. Ethiopia has consistently tried to move towards normalization of relations during the last six years. Eritrea has, as consistently, deliberately and definitely, refused to countenance the idea. As a result, there has been no peace and reconciliation, no resumption of trade, no discussion of border demarcation issues, and no cooperation on security. In a word there has been no cessation of hostilities, and without that there can be no boundary demarcation. Ethiopia is well aware that it would gain nothing by any Eritrean slide into anarchy and disorder, but it is the Eritrean government which controls this, not Ethiopia or any of its alleged policies, nor even the UN, the US or the CIA as the Eritrean leader so frequently claims.
While the ICG report does put considerable emphasis on Eritrea’s domestic problems, its conclusions almost appear to be part of the government’s campaign to deflect the international community’s attention away from Eritrea’s destabilizing activities, offering an excuse for the regime to get away with the UN Security Council sanctions. “It is inadequate and unhelpful to portray Eritrea as the regional spoiler.” It is no coincidence that Eritrean diplomats are currently busy trying to link their role in Somalia and throughout the region, and what they call “Ethiopia’s illegal occupation of Eritrean ‘sovereign’ territory”. They are making an attempt to recast the regime in Asmara as having a potentially constructive role to play in bringing about a peaceful resolution of conflict in the region, and more particularly in Somalia. With its comments on border issues and its acceptance of Eritrea’s view of the world, the ICG appears to support this, even if it differs over the government’s internal views. As we have previously noted, this hasn’t prevented the regime sending boatloads of troublemakers to Ethiopia and arms to Somalia just as it was apparently rolling out a red carpet for those who naively believe it is possible to change Eritrean government policies. The ICG’s dismissal of Eritrea’s destabilization activities suggests the report is actually designed to sell the insidious agenda of getting the Eritrean government off the hook of UN Sanctions.