A cautionary note on Eritrea’s conduct
Just over ten years ago in June 2000, Eritrea, reluctantly, acknowledged that it had been defeated in the war that it had launched two years earlier when Eritrean troops seized the town of Badme in May 1998. Subsequently, the Claims Commission, set up under the Algiers Agreement which ended the war, found Eritrea liable for its unprovoked aggression against Ethiopia in violation of the United Nations Charter. In its Partial Award Jus Ad Bellum (December 19, 2005), paragraph 16, the Commission stated categorically “Consequently, the Commission holds that Eritrea violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations by resorting to armed force to attack and occupy Badme, then under peaceful administration by Ethiopia as well as other territory…in an attack that began on May 12, 1998…”
A decade ago, the war was brought to an end by the Cessation of Hostilities in June 2000 and the Algiers Agreement of December that year. The former set up a Temporary Security Zone, a 25- kilometre wide zone inside Eritrea to provide a buffer between the two armies, to be patrolled and monitored by a United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The zone was created by the voluntary withdrawal of Ethiopian troops following their successful counter-offensive against Eritrea’s invasion of Ethiopia. The Agreements also set up the Claims Commission to investigate compensation claims arising from the conflict, and the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission to delimit the border and to demarcate it. UNMEE was given the additional task of providing support and security for the demarcation.
The EEBC’s Delimitation Decisions were announced in April 2002. While Eritrea accepted them immediately, Ethiopia raised a number of concerns over inconsistencies in the Decisions, and tried to work with the Commission to look for legal ways to resolve its complaints. In the end, despite failing to get satisfaction from the EEBC, Ethiopia accepted the Delimitation Decisions in November 2004 making it clear it was prepared to proceed to demarcation on the basis of dialogue and in conformity with international practice, and with respect to bringing about sustainable peace. Sir Elihu Lautherpacht, the EEBC Chairman, subsequently put on record at a meeting of the EEBC that “we have taken note of the fact that Ethiopia has accepted the delimitation decision. At one time there was a qualification of that acceptance by the expression ‘in principle’ and we understand that this has now been dropped so it is a complete and unconditional acceptance, so there is no doubt that Ethiopia is willing to move on to the complete demarcation of the boundary and all we are trying to do is to figure out how to go about that.”
However, Eritrea’s response to Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Delimitation Decisions was increasingly blunt refusals to normalize relations or hold any dialogue to lay the basis for sustainable peace. Indeed, as soon as Ethiopia accepted the EEBC Delimitation Decisions in November 2004, Eritrea openly and consistently began to flout the Algiers Agreements, beginning a series of violations of the TSZ with the infiltration of its forces into the zone. When these violations met with no more than mild critical comment from the UN Security Council, Eritrea steadily expanded its activities until it had taken over the whole TSZ, eventually forcing out UNMEE by withdrawing all facilities for the Mission. As Eritrea expanded its activities in the TSZ, the UN Secretary-General noted that Eritrea’s actions “represent a serious violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 18th June 2000”. In a report of July 2007, the Secretary-General referred to President Isaias’ comment two months earlier that the TSZ had been rendered “obsolete and meaningless” and noted UNMEE’s assessment that “thousands” of Eritrean Defence Force personnel were now “actively constructing new defences in the Zone”.
The Security Council did in fact pass a number of resolutions demanding Eritrea remove the restrictions it imposed on UNMEE, including the restriction of night patrols and supply routes, banning the use of helicopters even for medical emergencies, and finally cutting off fuel supplies, but it did nothing else. By February 2008, UNMEE was, humiliatingly, forced to withdraw from the Zone completely, thus rendering the central element of the Algiers Agreement, and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities null and void. The Security Council formally terminated UNMEE’s mandate on 31st July 2008, in Resolution 1827, noting that Eritrea’s actions had “reached a level so as to undermine the basis of the Mission’s mandate”.
Since that time, Eritrea has continued its refusal to respond to any and all UN Security Council resolutions, including, for example, Resolution 1827 (30 July 2008) when the Security Council, “recalling [its] previous condemnation of Eritrea's lack of cooperation”, demanded the “full and expeditious implementation” of the Algiers Agreements “as the basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea”, and reaffirmed the integrity of the TSZ. Eritrea has continued to claim all its actions, including rather surprisingly its invasion of Djibouti in mid 2008, have been caused by its “frustration” over Ethiopia’s alleged refusal to demarcate. In fact, Eritrea’s deliberate efforts to unpick the Algiers Agreements long post-dated Ethiopia’s full acceptance of the EEBC Delimitation Decisions. Following that acceptance, it has been Eritrea that has continuously raised barriers to the demarcation process, violating the Agreement on the cessation of Hostilities, and the TSZ, and clearly demonstrating it preferred the continuation of the dispute rather than its resolution.
Indeed, Eritrea’s interest in the border issue has always been subordinate to its wider ambitions to destabilize Ethiopia and to weaken neighbouring states. Right from the outset, it was not the border issue that caused problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The origin of the crisis lay in Eritrea’s destructive conduct, its irresponsible leadership. This remains the case, and until this is resolved, something that Security Council Resolution 1907 tried to address, there appears to be little chance that Eritrea will change its policies. Any attempt to reduce the mischief caused by Eritrea in the region to the level of bilateral conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea can hardly serve the interests of peace.
This is precisely what the Eritrean leadership has been trying to promote for some time, but it ignores exactly what Eritrea has been doing in the region. In Somalia, for example, this has included support for Al-Shabaab as well as other extremist groups. There has been, and still is, a consistency to Eritrean strategy, a strategy that has nothing to do with any border dispute, or with supporting peace, security or regional stability. Eritrea has been the major source of instability in the IGAD region for the last decade. Again and again, Eritrea has used conflict as an element of foreign policy, passing up possibilities that might lead to peace, consistently refusing to accept the good offices of the UN or any other international assistance to resolve its problems whether with Ethiopia or any of its other neighbours. Equally, there is no indication that its recent acceptance of Qatar’s mediation in its dispute with Djibouti actually represents anything other than an attempt to persuade the Security Council to withdraw last December’s Resolution 1907 imposing sanctions.
In conclusion, what A Week in the Horn wants to reiterate is that the achievement of peace, security and stability in the Horn of Africa will continue to be problematic until the Eritrean leadership is brought to realize that destabilization of the region cannot be permitted. Assisting terrorism, directly or indirectly, cannot be tolerated by the international community. Eritrea should realize this. Any indication given to the Eritrean leadership that there is any justification for its behaviour can only perpetuate the crisis of the Horn of Africa. All states in the region, including Ethiopia and the IGAD countries, have every reason to accommodate an Eritrea which is committed to peace and stability and regional co-operation. One has to admit, however, that this possibility still appears remote.