“Constructive disengagement” and the abandonment of Somalia to Al-Shabaab
Surprisingly, even the shock and horror of the suicide bombings in Kampala haven’t affected those analysts who have been arguing that it would be better to pull out all peacekeepers from Mogadishu, let the Government of Somalia collapse, and Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda take over the country. Bronwyn Bruton, in a report for the Council of Foreign Relations in Washington, called for the US to adopt what she called a strategy of “constructive disengagement”. The meaning of ‘constructive’ and the meaning of ‘disengagement’ are clear enough, but it’s when you put the two together that they become an oxymoron; others might interpret the phrase rather more crudely. It is in fact simply meaningless, though it is clear what Ms. Bruton intends to mean: the withdrawal of any and all US involvement in Somalia and the abandonment of the Government of Somalia. The bombings in Kampala have made no difference to her views, reiterated in an article the New York Times [“In Somalia, Talk to the Enemy, 24.7.2010]. The US, she argues, can best serve Somalia by allowing its government to disappear, and Al-Shabaab, now known to be largely controlled by a small coterie of Al Qaeda operatives, to take control.
Ms. Bruton claims that Al-Shabaab is a much divided organisation and will collapse in the face of growing opposition from clan and business militias. That is an assumption that is difficult to support, and in the meantime her policy will allow the people of Somalia to fall under the control of what she herself describes as “ a vicious mob of teenage radicals” who are “clearly getting guidance from Al Qaeda”. She notes Al-Shabaab has “proudly” claimed responsibility for the Kampala bombings, and goes on to accept that it is led by extremists fresh from the battlefields of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, has recruited “thousands of Somali children into its militias and uses them to brutally impose a foreign ideology on the religiously moderate Somali people. The ‘child judges’ as they are known are responsible for many of Al-Shabaab’s worst human rights violations, including stoning and amputations.”
It is in the face of this scenario that Ms. Bruton returns to her suggested “constructive disengagement”, which in fact looks to spread this horrifying behaviour even more widely. Al-Shabaab currently controls less than about a third of Somalia. Ms. Bruton wants to hand over the rest of the country to it! The destruction of the Government of Somalia will mean the imposition of a climate of fear and human rights abuse over huge areas of Somalia currently free from Al-Shabaab’s extremism. The fall of Mogadishu will lead to the flight of hundreds of thousands more IDPs and an even more extensive humanitarian disaster. Already the international agencies are finding it almost impossible to cope, not because they have pulled out but because Al-Shabaab refuses to allow their operations in areas that it controls.
Such a policy will allow the advance of Al-Shabaab forces into currently peaceful areas of central Somalia where it will face considerable resistance from the more moderate Islamic forces of Ahlu Suna wal Jama’a, an ally and indeed a participant in the TFG. It will then threaten other essentially peaceful areas to the north east, Puntland and even Somaliland which has just held a peaceful and impressive democratic change of government. Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda have already made very clear their intention to try to expand their brand of terrorist extremism across the whole region. Abandoning the TFG will provide them with a green light. Frankly, it is a truly terrifying scenario.
Another US analyst who has recently taken to arguing the same point is Dr. Peter Pham: “remove the foreign interests, let the cards fall where they will for the transitional government and you will see Al-Shabaab beginning to break apart into various factions.”
It’s no surprise that Al-Shabaab and its supporters have welcomed the concept of “constructive disengagement”, a concept that would allow them a free hand in Somalia and in the region.
In fact, these arguments are based on a number of inaccurate or untested assumptions: that Al-Shabaab’s strength is based on anti-foreign feelings in Somalia (a claim that ignores the fact that Al-Shabaab appears well before the arrival of Ethiopian troops at the request of the Somali government); that Al-Shabaab’s current leadership will be unable to control the organisation; that the climate of fear that it has engendered will break down; or that some Al-Shabaab elements will be prepared to join another government (begging the question of how such a government could be established in the wake of the disappearance of the TFG). There is, of course, no indication whatever that Al-Shabaab is interested in any element of moderation. All available evidence is to the contrary. Of equal concern is that Ms. Bruton and others apparently have no understanding of current IGAD or regional policies towards Somalia. Boosting AMISOM and the security capacity of the TFG are not the only elements. Capacity building for the TFG, and the TFIs, constitution drafting in advance of the end of the transitional period, efforts to expand government support through the peace and reconciliation process, as indicated by the agreement with Ahlu Suna wal Jama’a and the agreement with the government of Puntland, are all elements of IGAD policy.The TFG has its own internal problems, of course, and there is a very real need to resolve its divisions. But as important has been the failure of the international community to understand the dangers of the situation in Somalia, to provide properly targeted and sufficient support to enable the TFG and the TFIs to function effectively. The international response to the Kampala bombings, and the recent AU Summit, do however suggest the international community may finally be closer to understanding the realities of the Somali situation. These do not involve “constructive disengagement”, abandoning ten million Somalis to the hands of a “vicious mob of teenage radicals” controlled by Al Qaeda, or offering up an entire region of the African continent to international terrorism.